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Abstract
This paper derives a version of the Samuelson rule, which takes not
only the marginal costs of public funds into account but also the desir-
ability of preference revelation. Under a linear income tax more able
individuals suﬀer from a larger utility loss if taxes are raised to cover
the cost of public good provision. This implies that these individuals
are tempted to understate their valuation of the public good. Likewise,
less productive individuals are inclined to exaggerate their valuation.
These incentive concerns require the use of excessive taxes. They en-
sure a truthful revelation of preferences for the public good. Under an
optimal utilitarian tax constitution, individuals are not granted inﬂu-
ence on public good provision if the taxes needed to induce informative
behavior are prohibitively high.
Keywords: Public Good Provision, Revelation of Preferences, Distor-
tionary Taxation, Two-dimensional Heterogeneity.
JEL: D71, D82, H21, H41
1 Introduction
This paper derives the optimal utilitarian rule for public good provision un-
der the premise that the costs are covered via distortionary taxation and
that individuals have private information of their valuation of the public
good. The existing literature has been concerned either with the impact of
distortionary taxation or with the consequences of private information.
One branch of the literature is the theory of optimal taxation. It charac-
terizes the optimal quantity of a public good by a modiﬁed Samuelson rule
∗I am very grateful for comments and suggestions of Martin Hellwig, Thomas Gaube
and Christoph Engel. I thank participants of the ENTER Jamboree 2004 in Barcelona, of
the Theory Workshop at Mannheim University and the PET 2005 Meeting in Marseille.
1that equates the marginal costs of public funds and the sum of marginal
utilities.1 In this framework, a problem of preference elicitation does not
arise because the distribution of preferences in the economy is assumed to
be common knowledge.
The second branch is the literature on the free-rider problem in public good
provision, which studies the question what an optimal allocation of public
goods looks like if individuals have private information of their preferences
of a public good.2 This literature focusses on quasilinear environments in
which the marginal disutility of having to pay for the public good is con-
stant for all individuals. Hence, in this approach, payment obligations do
not drive a wedge between marginal rates of substitution and marginal rates
of transformation; that is, taxation is not distortionary.
The contribution of this paper is the derivation of a twice modiﬁed Samuel-
son rule that takes into account the welfare burden of distortionary taxes
and, in addition, the desirability of preference revelation. This concern is
not only driven by the desire to have a more complete theory. There is an
interesting economic relationship between these two issues: Whether or not
an individual is willing to reveal her valuation of a public good depends on
the way she is treated by the tax system.
To see this, suppose that, as in this paper, a linear tax on income is used
for public goods ﬁnance. Consequently, individuals with a higher level of
income pay more taxes and hence contribute more to the cost of public
good provision. When asked to report their preferences, these individuals
compare their utility gain from public good provision to their additional tax
burden. The fact that they have to contribute relatively large payments
may imply that they refuse to reveal their true valuation of the public good.
Instead, they choose their announcement such that they prevent the public
good from being provided.
In more general terms, the tax system aﬀects the willingness of individuals
to reveal their valuation of a public good and is thus a potential source of
incentive problems. This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to discuss what an optimal
response to these incentive problems looks like in a model which is as simple
as possible: Individuals either have a low or a high level of earning ability.
Likewise, valuations for the public good are either high or low. For the econ-
omy as a whole, there is uncertainty about the public goods preferences of
the “rich” class and the “poor” class of agents, respectively.3 The decision
1Examples include Atkinson and Stern (1974), Wilson (1991), Boadway and Keen
(1993), Nava et al. (1996), Sandmo (1998), Hellwig (2004) and Gaube (2000, 2005).
2The seminal contributions in the early literature are Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)
and Green and Laﬀont (1977). See Hellwig (2003) or Norman (2004) for more recent
treatments.
3The assumption that earning ability as well as public goods preferences can only take
two values is made for reasons of tractability. The papers on two-dimensional screening
problems by Armstrong and Rochet (1999) and Cremer et al. (2001) follow a similar
modeling strategy.
2on public good provision is binary, i.e. the public good is either installed or
not.4 Finally, the tax instrument used to ﬁnance public good provision is a
linear tax on income.
An analysis of the free-rider problem under distortionary taxation can be
conducted for all kinds of tax instruments, an aﬃne linear income tax, a non-
linear income tax, a combination of direct and indirect tax instruments, etc.
This paper focusses on a linear tax on income that is raised only to cover the
cost of public good provision. This setup has the advantage of simplicity. In
particular, it is easily seen how the tax system shapes individual assessments
of the public good: The formal analysis proceeds under the assumption that
individuals reduce their labor supply in response to an increased tax on in-
come. Under this premise, it can be shown that individuals with a high level
of earning ability suﬀer ceteris paribus from a larger utility loss if additional
taxes are raised. Consequently the burden of taxation for a public good that
is enjoyed by individuals of both classes is essentially carried by the “rich”
class.
This generates the following pattern of incentive problems: More able in-
dividuals tend to understate their willingness to pay for the public good
because they suﬀer more intensively from an increase of the tax revenue re-
quirement. Analogously, less able individuals exaggerate when asked about
their valuation because they don’t feel a large utility burden from higher
taxes.
As an example, think of the decision whether or not to use public money for
the construction of a park. For the sake of the argument, suppose that the
true state of the world is such that all inhabitants of the town realize the
same utility gain if the park is available. Due to the tax system, however,
the decision whether or not to install it creates conﬂicting interests between
individuals with a high level of income and individuals with a low level of
income. These interests govern the behavior of individuals in the revelation
game and thus create an impediment for the acquisition of information on
preferences.
The example illustrates that a pattern of incentive problems where less able
individuals tend to exaggerate their preferences and the more able are too
reserved is a plausible case.5 As a consequence, incentive compatibility con-
straints imply that the twice modiﬁed Samuelson rule relies on the use of
excessive taxes, i.e. of taxes which are larger than actually needed to cover
4Bierbrauer and Sahm (2005) do not assume a perfect correlation of earning ability
and public goods preferences, and they allow for a continuum of diﬀerent provision levels.
5It is, however, not the only conceivable constellation. The pattern is reversed under a
non-linear income tax system, as shown in Bierbrauer (2005b). If the tax system generates,
in addition, direct income transfers from “rich” to “poor” households, then less able
individuals oppose public good provision more intensively. Tax revenues that are spent
on public goods are not available for redistribution any more. This observation is assessed
diﬀerently by the “rich” and the “poor”.
3the cost of public good provision. These are used for two diﬀerent reasons.
Either they serve to make public good provision artiﬁcially expensive. This
case arises if incentive compatibility conditions are needed to prevent less
able individuals from exaggerating their valuation of the public good; that
is, excessive taxes are used to make the public good less attractive for the
less able class. Alternatively, if the more able individuals’ temptation to un-
derstate their preferences causes an incentive problem, then excessive taxes
can be used to make the non-provision of the public good less attractive.
If these excessive taxes become very high, then an optimal provision rule
does not incorporate all pieces of information. Suppose for instance, that
one needs to accompany public good provision with very high taxes in order
to ensure a truthful statement from less able individuals on their valuation
of the public good. Then, an optimal provision rule does not try to acquire
information from them. Put diﬀerently, information that is too costly to
obtain is neglected by the twice modiﬁed Samuelson rule.
More generally, the analysis shows that an optimal response to incentive
problems takes one of the following forms. Either the tax system is dis-
torted in order to ensure that valuable information on public goods prefer-
ences becomes available or the optimal provision rule is modiﬁed and does
not require full information on the distribution of public goods preferences
in the economy.
The remainder is organized as follows. The next section speciﬁes the model.
In Section 3, as a benchmark, the modiﬁed Samuelson rule is derived. Sec-
tion 4 solves for the twice modiﬁed Samuelson rule. In Section 5, I discuss
how the possibility of direct income transfers would aﬀect the results. The
last section contains concluding remarks. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The environment
The economy consists of two classes of agents that are characterized by the
earning ability levels w1 and w2, where w2 > w1, i.e. class 2 agents are
more productive. It is commonly known that there are equal shares of more
and less productive individuals in the population. Individuals of class t,
t ∈ {1,2}, have a common taste parameter θt, which aﬀects their valuation
of a public good. Moreover, θt is private information of individuals who
belong to class t.
The economy as a whole is subject to uncertainty about these taste parame-
ters; θ1 and θ2 are taken to be the realizations of random variables ˜ θ1 and ˜ θ2.
Both random variables can only take two values, θL and θH, where θL < θH.
Consequently, there are four possible states of the economy, depending on
the preference parameters of class 1 and class 2 individuals, i.e. depending
on the actual value of the vector (θ1,θ2), where
(θ1,θ2) ∈ {(θL,θL),(θL,θH),(θH,θL),(θH,θH)} .
4The utility function of individuals who belong to class t is given by






C denotes consumption of private goods, and Y = Lwt denotes eﬀective
labor or income; that is, wt can be interpreted as a wage rate and L denotes
hours worked to generate income Y . Obviously, to achieve a given income
Y , individuals with a lower wage have to work more. Q ∈ {0,1} stands
for a public project which is either installed or not. The functions u and
v are strictly increasing and twice continuously diﬀerentiable. Moreover,
u is concave and v is convex. In addition, those functions satisfy the fol-
lowing boundary condition, which ensures interior solutions to optimization










I use a mechanism design approach to characterize admissible schemes of
taxation and public good provision. An allocation rule speciﬁes for each
state (θ1,θ2) ∈ {θL,θH}2 a decision on public good provision Q(θ1,θ2) and
a linear income tax rate τ(θ1,θ2). The revenues generated by this tax are
used only to cover the cost of public good provision.6
An allocation rule has to satisfy a budget constraint (BC). In every state
(θ1,θ2) the tax revenues from linear income taxation have to be suﬃcient to
cover the cost k of public good provision. Formally, for all (θ1,θ2),
τ(θ1,θ2)[Y1(τ(θ1,θ2)) + Y2(τ(θ1,θ2))] ≥ kQ(θ1,θ2) , (1)
where, for each t ∈ {1,2}, Yt(τ(θ1,θ2)) is the utility maximizing level of ef-
fective labor supply for an individual who belongs to class t. More precisely,
Yt(τ(θ1,θ2)) is the unique solution of the following maximization problem:






The above budget constraint allows for a budget surplus, i.e. for tax rates
which are higher than actually needed. It will become clear that, for incen-
tive reasons, a deviation from budget balance may be desirable.
In addition to the budget constraint, an allocation rule has to satisfy incen-
tive compatibility constraints (IC). These constraints ensure that individuals
of either class are willing to reveal their taste parameter truthfully.
∀θ1,∀ˆ θ1,∀θ2 : θ1Q(θ1,θ2) + V1(θ1,θ2) ≥ θ1Q(ˆ θ1,θ2) + V1(ˆ θ1,θ2) ,
∀θ2,∀ˆ θ2,∀θ1 : θ2Q(θ1,θ2) + V2(θ1,θ2) ≥ θ2Q(θ1, ˆ θ2) + V2(θ1, ˆ θ2) ,
(3)
6While this is the easiest way to introduce a distortionary tax instrument into the
analysis, it is certainly not the only case of interest. The impact of this assumption and
alternative speciﬁcations of the tax system are discussed in more detail in Section 5.
5where Vt(θ1,θ2) denotes the indirect utility function of problem (2),






These incentive constraints are based on the presumption that, in the un-
derlying revelation game, all individuals who belong to the same class make
the same taste announcement. They ensure that the individuals of class t
are not better oﬀ under a joint collective lie about their taste parameter,
whatever the collective taste announcement of individuals who belong to
class t′  = t. Put diﬀerently, from the class perspective the truth is required
to be a dominant strategy.7
A more extensive discussion of these incentive constraints can be found in
Bierbrauer (2005a) and in Bierbrauer (2005b). These papers develop the
notion of a collectively incentive compatible income tax mechanism. The
collective incentive requirement addresses the following situation: Suppose
that in order to ﬁgure out the actual state of the economy, a tax setting
planner has to acquire information on individual valuations of a public good.
Individuals may form coalitions in order to manipulate jointly the planner’s
perception of the state of the economy. As a consequence, the planner will
discover the true state only if he decides on public good provision in a way
which eliminates all incentives for manipulative collective actions. Obvi-
ously, the above incentive constraints, which address collective actions on
the class level only, are a necessary condition for collective incentive compat-
ibility. For a more precise statement of conditions under which this property
is also suﬃcient, the reader is referred to Bierbrauer (2005a) and Bierbrauer
(2005b). For the purpose of the present paper, I just note that those condi-
tions are met.
The interpretation of these incentive constraints is as follows. The tax sys-
tem shapes the views on public good provision of more and less productive
individuals. Taking these interests into account, a decision on public good
provision can use the actual taste parameter of any one group as an informa-
tional input only if these individuals are not made worse oﬀ if their private
information becomes available.
An optimal allocation rule maximizes utilitarian welfare from an ex-ante
perspective, deﬁned as a hypothetical situation where the actual state of
the economy (θx,θy) is not yet known, where x,y ∈ {L,H} indicate the
taste realizations of class 1 and class 2 individuals, respectively. The objec-
tive function is a weighted average of the welfare levels (Wxy), where
Wxy := (θx + θy)Q(θx,θy) + V1(θx,θy) + V2(θx,θy) .
7The main advantage of implementation in dominant strategies is that the set of ad-
missible allocations does not depend on assumptions about the prior beliefs of individuals.
See e.g. Bergemann and Morris (2005); Chung and Ely (2004) or Kalai (2004).
6The probability weights are taken to be the prior beliefs of the tax set-
ting planner, which are denoted p := (pLL,pLH,pHL,pHH), where pLL :=
prob(θL,θL), pLH := prob(θL,θH), etc. Expected welfare from the planner’s
ex ante perspective is accordingly given by
EW := pLLWLL + pLHWLH + pHLWHL + pHHWHH .
Deﬁnition 1 The optimal utilitarian allocation rule solves the problem of
choosing the functions Q : (θ1,θ2)  → Q(θ1,θ2) and τ : (θ1,θ2)  → τ(θ1,θ2)
in order to maximize EW, subject to the budget constraints in (1) and the
incentive compatibility constraints in (3).
3 The complete information benchmark
To understand the impact of the incentive compatibility conditions, this
section discusses, as a benchmark, the allocation rule that would be chosen
by an informed utilitarian planner, i.e. a planner who happens to know the
actual value of (θ1,θ2). For brevity, I refer to this outcome as the informed
optimum.
Some more pieces of notation are helpful. Denote by U∗(τ,wt) the indirect
utility that is derived from consumption of private goods by an individual
with earning ability wt who faces a linear income tax rate of τ,






Denote by τk the linear tax rate which ensures cost coverage in case of public
good provision. This tax rate is implicitly deﬁned by the following equation,
τk(Y1(τk) + Y2(τk)) = k .
Let ∆U∗
t denote the private utility loss of a class t individual as the tax rate
increases from 0 to τk,
∆U∗
t := U∗(0,wt) − U∗(τk,wt) .
Denote by ∆W∗




The informed optimum consists of a tax rule τ∗ and a provision rule Q∗.
The tax rule τ∗ ensures a binding budget constraint,
τ∗(θ1,θ2) =
￿
0, if Q∗ = 0
τk, if Q∗ = 1.
Moreover, the informed planner chooses provision rule Q∗ such that the
public good is installed as soon as the aggregate utility gain exceeds the




p > θ1 + θ2
1 otherwise.
7The informed optimum is completely characterized by the tax rule τ∗ and
the provision rule Q∗. However, the model outlined so far allows for a
variety of diﬀerent parameter constellations. For instance, if ∆W∗
p < 2θL,
then Q∗ is such that the public good is provided in every state of the world,
i.e. Q∗(θ1,θ2) = 1 for all (θ1,θ2). To avoid a lengthy discussion of each
conceivable parameter constellation, I focus on a particular case.
Assumption 1 An informed planner chooses to install the public good in
all states except state (θL,θL):8
θH + θL ≥ ∆W∗
p ≥ 2θL .
For ease of reference, I denote by Qi : Q = 0 ⇐⇒ (θ1,θ2) = (θL,θL), the
provision rule chosen by an informed planner. Put diﬀerently, Qi is the
modiﬁed Samuelson rule, which takes the distortions due to the tax rule τ∗
into account but assumes that the information on public goods preferences
just happens to be available.
Conﬂicting interests induced by the informed optimum
The informed optimum may give rise to conﬂicting views on the desirability
of public good provision. For the sake of concreteness, suppose that
∆U∗
2 > θH > θL > ∆U∗
1 . (4)
In this scenario, for less productive individuals, the private utility loss is so
small that, in all states, they are better oﬀ if the public good is installed.
By contrast, the more productive suﬀer so heavily as the tax rate increases
from 0 to τk that they are always worse oﬀ if the public good is installed.
A clariﬁcation of the possible patterns of conﬂicting interests is important
for an understanding of the impact of incentive compatibility constraints.
Intuitively, if the scenario characterized by the inequalities in (4) arises,
more productive individuals want to prevent the public good from being
installed in every state and hence have an incentive to report a low taste
realization, even if in fact their taste parameter is high. Likewise, the less
able class wants to ensure provision and is tempted to report a high taste
parameter in case of a low taste realization.
In the remainder of this section the possible parameter constellations of the
model are characterized. It will become clear that the situation in (4) corre-
sponds to a particular scenario, namely the one where the conﬂict on public
8Obviously, a parameter constellation such that Q = 1 is desired in every (no) state
of the world is not very interesting. Hence, the only alternative of interest is that Q = 0
is preferred in states (θL,θH) and (θH,θL). An investigation of this case gives rise to an
analysis analogous to the one presented below.
8good provision is most intense.
The following lemma is the key to an understanding of possible scenarios
of conﬂicting interests. It shows that, for the more productive class of indi-
viduals, the private utility loss is larger if the tax rate τ goes up. In more
technical terms, the lemma establishes a property of increasing diﬀerences
according to which a larger productivity level translates into a larger pri-
vate utility loss. The proof relies on the assumption that individuals decrease
their labor supply in response to an increase in the tax rate.
Assumption 2 Labor supply is a decreasing function of τ:9
∀t ∈ {1,2},∀τ ∈ [0,1[: Y ′
t (τ) < 0 .
Lemma 1 For any pair of tax rates τ
¯
and ¯ τ with ¯ τ > τ
¯




,w1) − U∗(¯ τ,w1) < U∗(τ
¯
,w2) − U∗(¯ τ,w2) .
It is easily veriﬁed that individuals with a high earning ability choose, for any
tax rate, a higher level of eﬀective labor supply; that is, the more productive
class has a higher level of income and thus pays more taxes. According
to Lemma 1, this implies that ceteris paribus it is harder to convince the
more productive class of individuals that the utility gain from public good
provision justiﬁes an increase of the tax rate.10
If combined with Lemma 1, Assumption 1 implies that the more able class
is made worse oﬀ by public good provision in case of a low taste realization,
i.e. if θ2 = θL. Likewise, less able individuals are better oﬀ if the public
good is installed when θ1 = θH; that is,
∆U∗
2 > θL and θH > ∆U∗
1 .
These inequalities in conjunction with Assumption 1 reduce the set of pos-
sible parameter constellations. The following three scenarios may arise.
Scenario 1: θH ≥ ∆U∗
2 > ∆U∗
1 ≥ θL ,
Scenario 2: θH ≥ ∆U∗
2 ≥ θL > ∆U∗
1 ,
9This assumption has been introduced by Sheshinski (1972) in a model of optimal linear
income taxation and lump sum redistribution. Its role is further discussed in Hellwig
(1986). An alternative assumption, which also yields the result of Lemma 1, is made in
Persson and Tabellini (2000, Ch. 3). There income is exogenous, and utility is quasilinear
in consumption.
10However, the proof relies on Assumption 2 according to which the substitution eﬀect
associated with a higher tax rate dominates the income eﬀect. If this relation was reversed,
the conclusion of Lemma 1 would be reversed as well. An analysis based on this alternative
premise would have to follow the same line of reasoning as the one developed below.
9Scenario 3: ∆U∗
2 > θH > θL > ∆U∗
1 .
These inequalities are interpreted as follows.
Scenario 1: Individuals of any class, are better oﬀ by public good provision
if their taste realization is high, θt = θH. They are worse oﬀ in case of a low
taste realization, θt = θL. Scenario 1 hence gives rise to the statement that,
at the informed optimum, willingness to pay for the public good is indepen-
dent of earning ability, but depends only on the taste realization.
Scenario 2: As under Scenario 1, more productive individuals desire public
good provision only if their utility gain is large, i.e. only if θ2 = θH. In
contrast, less productive individuals, whose utility loss is smaller, beneﬁt
from provision in any state; that is, even if θ1 = θL.
Scenario 3: As under Scenario 2, less productive individuals always enjoy
the public good. More able individuals, however, suﬀer from such a heavy
utility loss that public good provision makes them worse oﬀ even if θ2 = θH.
These Scenarios can be ordered with respect to the polarization of views on
public good provision. Under Scenario 1 there is no polarization in the sense
that both groups of individuals oppose public good provision if and only if
their taste parameter is low. Under Scenario 3, the polarization is extreme;
more productive individuals are against provision whatever their taste re-
alization and less productive individuals always desire provision. Hence, in
any state of the world, there is a conﬂict between more and less productive
individuals. Scenario 2 is an intermediate case. While both groups prefer
non-provision if their taste parameter is low (as under Scenario 1), the less
productive desire public good provision even with a low taste parameter (as
under Scenario 3).
4 The twice modiﬁed Samuelson rule
In this section the optimal tax rule and the optimal provision rule for the
public good – i.e. the solution to the optimization problem in Deﬁnition 1
– is characterized for each parameter constellation of the model; that is, for
each of the three scenarios deﬁned in the previous section. The optimal al-
location rule has to satisfy incentive compatibility. Hence, I call the optimal
allocation a twice modiﬁed Samuelson rule because it takes into account the
marginal costs of public funds under a linear income tax and, in addition,
the desirability of preference revelation.
4.1 Admissible provision rules
The optimal allocation rule is derived via a two step procedure. The ﬁrst
step solves for an optimal tax rule, taking the provision rule for the public
good as given. The second step determines the optimal provision rule. This
10approach is tractable because of the fact that the IC constraints limit the
number of admissible provision rules.
Lemma 2 Incentive compatible provision rules are increasing in both ar-
guments, ∀θ1: Q(θ1,θL) ≤ Q(θ1,θH) and ∀θ2 : Q(θL,θ2) ≤ Q(θH,θ2).
These monotonicity constraints imply that there are only six candidate pro-
vision rules. Provision rule Qi : Q = 0 ⇐⇒ (θ1,θ2) = (θL,θL), which is part
of the informed optimum, satisﬁes these constraints. The same is true for
provision rule Qi′, deﬁned by Q = 1 ⇐⇒ (θ1,θ2) = (θH,θH), provision rule
Q1, which calls for public good provision if and only if class 1 individuals
have a high taste parameter Q1 : Q = 1 ⇐⇒ θ1 = θH, and the analogously
deﬁned provision rule Q2 : Q = 1 ⇐⇒ θ2 = θH. Finally, the monotonicity
constraints are trivially satisﬁed by the constant provision rules Q ≡ 0 and
Q ≡ 1.
Any such provision rule can be interpreted in terms of the inﬂuence that
is assigned to individuals of diﬀerent classes. For instance, under provision
rule Qi, individuals of each class have a veto against Q = 0: whenever at
least one class of individuals collectively announces a high taste realization,
then the public good is provided. Likewise, under provision rule Qi′, each
class has a veto against Q = 1. Under provision rule Q1, the tax setting
planner listens only to the preference announcement of the less able class.
The more able have no inﬂuence on public good provision. Analogously,
under Q2, the decision on provision does not depend on the less able indi-
viduals’ taste announcement. Finally, under Q ≡ 0 and Q ≡ 1, neither class
has an impact.
4.2 Does incentive compatibility always matter?
As a ﬁrst step, I characterize the circumstances under which the requirement
of incentive compatibility indeed aﬀects the choice of an optimal allocation
rule. Obviously, incentive compatibility is not an issue if the informed op-
timum, as characterized by τ∗ and Q∗, satisﬁes the incentive compatibility
constraints in (3).
Under Assumption 1, the informed optimum has Q∗ = Qi. Using τ∗ this
implies that for class t, the informed optimum induces the following levels
of indirect private utility,
Vt(θ1,θ2) =
￿
U∗(0,wt), if (θ1,θ2) = (θL,θL)
U∗(τk,wt) otherwise.
These expressions can be used to check whether or not the informed optimum
satisﬁes the constraints in (3). It is easily veriﬁed that IC holds if and only
11if, for any class t,
θH ≥ ∆U∗
t ≥ θL .
This chain of inequalities is satisﬁed if and and only if Scenario 1 applies.
This proves the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The informed optimum is incentive compatible if and only
if Scenario 1 applies, i.e. if and only if willingness to pay for the public good
is independent of earning ability.
Thus, there is indeed a parameter constellation where the tax setting planner
gets the information on taste parameters for free; that is, without a welfare
loss due to binding incentive compatibility constraints. This is the case if
all high ability agents and all low ability agents want the public good to be
installed only in case of a high taste realization. Put diﬀerently, whether
or not an individual prefers Q = 1 over Q = 0 depends only on the taste
realization but not on the ability level.
Note, however, that the absence of incentive problems is not the same as the
absence of conﬂicting interests. To see this, suppose that the actual state of
the economy is (θL,θH). In this case, the less able individuals prefer Q = 0,
while the more productive prefer Q = 1. However, despite those conﬂicting
views, neither class has an incentive to hide its true taste realization. A
false announcement would not yield a preferred outcome.
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal allocation rule under Scenario 1. As
the informed optimum is incentive compatible, the modiﬁed Samuelson rule
and the twice modiﬁed Samuelson rule coincide. The analysis of Scenarios
2 and 3 shows that this is not generally the case.
4.3 Scenario 2
The analysis proceeds in two steps. Recall that an informed utilitarian plan-
ner would choose provision rule Qi. I ﬁrst indicate what taxes a utilitarian
planner chooses, given that this provision rule has to be implemented. Then,
I analyze whether this provision rule remains part of an optimal allocation
rule under incentive constraints.
4.3.1 Optimal taxes for provision rule Qi under Scenario 2
Under Scenario 2, incentive problems arise for the following reason. Given
that provision rule Qi is chosen or implementation and taxes are such that
the budget constraint binds, less able individuals will never admit a low taste
realization. Hence, if the planner sticks to provision rule Qi, a deviation
from budget balance becomes unavoidable. I will now solve for the optimal
12deviation.
I ﬁrst derive a concise statement of the planner’s problem. From substituting
Qi into the incentive compatibility constraints in (3), one ﬁnds that incentive
compatibility for the less able class requires that
θH ≥ V1(θL,θL) − V1(θH,θL) ≥ θL, V1(θL,θH) = V1(θH,θH). (5)
Similarly, the incentive constraints for the more productive are
θH ≥ V2(θL,θL) − V1(θL,θH) ≥ θL, V2(θH,θL) = V2(θH,θH). (6)
These incentive constraints imply that whenever Q = 1 the same tax rate
has to be used to cover the cost of provision, τ(θH,θH) = τ(θL,θH) =
τ(θH,θL).11 This tax rate is henceforth called ¯ τ, i.e.
¯ τ := τ(θH,θH) = τ(θL,θH) = τ(θH,θL) .
Analogously, deﬁne τ
¯
:= τ(θL,θL). Using those tax rates, the incentive
constraints for any class t can be rewritten as:
θH ≥ U∗(τ
¯
,wt) − U∗(¯ τ,wt) ≥ θL
In addition, from the property of increasing diﬀerences, the private utility
loss due to higher taxation is larger for individuals of class 2,
U∗(τ
¯
,w2) − U∗(¯ τ,w2) > U∗(τ
¯
,w1) − U∗(¯ τ,w1) .
Consequently, the planner only has to take the constraints θH ≥ U∗(τ
¯
,w2)−
U∗(¯ τ,w2) and U∗(τ
¯
,w1) − U∗(¯ τ,w1) ≥ θL into account.
In other words, the observation that it is harder to convince the more able
class that the public good should be installed implies that the IC conditions
can be simpliﬁed. IC holds whenever the “poor” are willing to admit a
low valuation of the public good and the “rich” are willing to admit a high
valuation.
The planner’s problem can now be stated in the following way: Denote
by Wp(τ) := U∗(τ,w1) + U∗(τ,w2) the welfare contribution of aggregate
private utility, given a tax rate of τ. An optimal choice of τ
¯
and ¯ τ solves





) + (1 − pLL)Wp(¯ τ)
s.t. τ
¯
≥ 0 , ¯ τ ≥ τk (BC) ,
θH ≥ U∗(τ
¯
,w2) − U∗(¯ τ,w2) (IC2) ,
U∗(τ
¯
,w1) − U∗(¯ τ,w1) ≥ θL (IC1) .
11 As the function U
∗(τ,wt) is strictly decreasing in τ, the constraint V1(θL,θH) =
V1(θH,θH) implies τ(θL,θH) = τ(θH,θH) and V2(θH,θL) = V2(θH,θH) gives τ(θH,θL) =
τ(θH,θH).
13I denote by τ
¯
∗∗ and ¯ τ∗∗ the second best tax rates, which solve P. In addition,
denote by τ1L the tax rate which satisﬁes
U∗(0,w1) − U∗(τ1L,w1) = θL .
τ1L makes less able individuals with θL indiﬀerent with respect to public
good provision, given that τ
¯
= 0. Note that by the deﬁnition of Scenario 1,
τ1L > τk.
Lemma 3
a) If θH ≥ U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2), then τ
¯
∗∗ = 0 and ¯ τ∗∗ = τ1L.
b) If θH < U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2), a solution to the planner’s problem
exists only if there are tax rates such that IC1 and IC2 are binding.
Furthermore, if a solution exists, then τ
¯
∗∗ > 0 and ¯ τ∗∗ > τk.
Under Scenario 2, the less productive class has to be prevented from an-
nouncing a high taste parameter if in fact their taste parameter is low. In
order to ﬁx this incentive problem, the outcome Q = 1 is made less attrac-
tive by excessive taxation, i.e. the tax ¯ τ∗∗ exceeds the level τk, which would
be suﬃcient to cover the cost of provision.
However, this excessive tax rate may generate a new incentive problem: if
the public good is made less attractive, then one might end up in a situa-
tion where more productive individuals are no longer willing to admit a high
valuation of the public good.
There are two possible cases. In case of a modest incentive problem – i.e. if
θH ≥ U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2) – the more able still prefer Q = 1 under an
excessive level of ¯ τ. In contrast, if incentive problems are severe, then Qi
is implementable only if both incentive constraints are binding. However,
a pair of tax rates such that both incentive constraints are binding need
not exist.12 If those tax rates do not exist, then, under a severe incentive
problem, provision rule Qi is not implementable.
In the next subsection I analyze whether the planner is indeed willing to
choose these excessive tax rates in order to be able to implement provision
rule Qi.
4.3.2 The optimal provision rule under Scenario 2
As has just been shown, if the planner wants to implement Qi, then he has
to accept the need to waste tax revenues, because the less able class loves
the public good too intensively. More generally, such a waste of tax revenues
12For standard examples of functional forms – Cobb Douglas utility in logarithmic
formulation or isoelastic components of private utility – those tax rates do not exist.
14becomes unavoidable if the decision on provision is made dependent on the
taste announcement of the less able class. This is true for provision rules
Qi, Qi′ and Q1.
There are, however, provision rules, which do not require excessive taxes.
Under provision rules Q ≡ 0 and Q ≡ 1, the decision on provision is not
state dependent. Consequently, there is no need to communicate and hence
no need for excessive taxes in order to ensure truth-telling. Under provi-
sion rule Q2, the planner only has to ask only the more able class about
their preferences. They want to induce public good provision if and only if
θ2 = θH. This implies that Q2 can also be implemented without having to
rely on excessive taxes.
A utilitarian planner faces a tradeoﬀ. Either he sticks to provision rule
Qi and has to burn money, or he decides not to burn money but deviates
from the provision rule that is part of the informed optimum. The following
proposition shows how a utilitarian planner deals with this issue, depending
on the intensity of incentive problems and his prior.
More precisely, the proposition summarizes the results from the following
exercise: For each candidate provision – i.e. for each provision rule in the
set {Qi,Qi′,Q1,Q2,Q ≡ 0,Q ≡ 0} – solve for the optimal tax rates that
implement this provision rule under budget and incentive constraints; that
is, for each candidate provision rule, solve the same kind of optimization
problem as the one discussed in subsection 4.3.1 for provision rule Qi. The
solution to each optimization problem allows the computation of the result-
ing welfare levels, which I denote by EWi, EWi′, EW1, EW2, EWQ≡0 and
EWQ≡1, respectively. A comparison of these welfare levels then determines
the optimal provision rule under budget as well as incentive constraints.
The welfare maximizing provision rule depends on the prior beliefs; that
is, on the probability weights that are used in the computation of expected
welfare levels. I say that a provision rule can be supported if there exists a
vector of prior beliefs p such that this provision rule turns out to be welfare
maximizing.
Proposition 2
i) Suppose the incentive problem is modest, i.e. θH ≥ U∗(0,w2) −
U∗(τ1L,w2). Then Q2, Qi and Q ≡ 1 can be supported.13
ii) Suppose the incentive problem is severe, θH < U∗(0,w2)−U∗(τ1L,w2).
Then Q2 and Q ≡ 1 can be supported.
Proposition 2 shows that, in case of a severe incentive problem – i.e. if
θH < U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2) – provision rule Qi is never chosen. Even
13For the special case θH = U
∗(0,w2) − U
∗(τ1L,w2), provision rules Q
1 and Q
i yield
the same level of expected utilitarian welfare. Otherwise Q
i is strictly superior.
15if tax rates exist under which this rule is implementable, the planner will
avoid the welfare burden of two binding incentive constraints. This shows
that incentive constraints may heavily aﬀect optimal policy: provision rule
Qi either becomes infeasible or undesirable.
In case of a severe incentive problem, only provision rules Q2 and Q ≡ 1,
which avoid excessive taxation by not giving any inﬂuence to the less able
class, are candidates for maximizing expected utilitarian welfare.14 In con-
trast, under modest incentive problems, the planner may stick to provision
rule Qi, i.e. the burden of excessive taxation is not necessarily prohibitive.15
In particular, these considerations show that the the second modiﬁcation of
the Samuelson rule can go either way. Under Q2 there are less states of
the economy in which the public good is installed relative to Qi. Under
Q ≡ 1 however, the public good is provided in every state. Hence, it de-
pends on the prior beliefs of the planner whether there is “underprovision”
or “overprovision” relative to Qi.
4.4 Scenario 3
Under Scenario 3, the incentive problem known from Scenario 2 – i.e. that
under budget balance, the less able will never admit a low valuation because
they want to ensure Q = 1 – is accompanied by another incentive problem
that is due to the more able class of individuals. Under budget balance,
they will not admit a high valuation because they hate having to pay for the
public good. Consequently, a case of modest incentive problems is not pos-
sible under Scenario 3; i.e. Scenario 3 is essentially equivalent to Scenario 2
with a severe incentive problem.
To see this, recall that the incentive problem caused by the less able requires
that the public good becomes less attractive. This requires an excessive tax
rate whenever the public good is installed. By contrast, the incentive prob-
lem caused by the more able class calls for an excessive tax rate that makes
non-provision a less attractive outcome. Those two incentive problems ag-
gravate each other: Trying to ﬁx the incentive problem for the less able class
makes the outcome Q = 1 less attractive, and this implies that it becomes
even harder to make the more able class willing to admit a high taste real-
ization.
Consequently, whenever a provision rule is chosen that gives inﬂuence to
both classes – recall that this is the case under Qi and Qi′– one ends up
14Which of them is superior depends on the likelihood of the states in which they
implement a diﬀerent allocation. By deﬁnition of Scenario 1, Q
2 yields ex post the higher
welfare level if (θ1,θ2) = (θL,θL), rule Q ≡ 1 is superior if (θ1,θ2) = (θH,θL).
15To see why Q
i comes in as an additional candidate for optimal policy, suppose that
pLL is suﬃciently large in the sense that Q
2 yields a higher expected welfare level than
Q ≡ 1. Ex post, rule Q
i gives a higher welfare level as compared to rule Q
2 if (θ1,θ2) =
(θH,θL), and rule Q
2 is more attractive if θ2 = θH. Hence, to ensure optimality of rule
Q
i conditionally on (θ1,θ2)  = (θL,θL), the probability that θ2 = θH must be small.
16with two binding incentive constraints. As has been discussed in the previ-
ous subsection this may imply that these provision rules can no longer be
implemented. This is the case if no pair of tax rates exists that makes the
incentive constraints of both classes binding.
One easily veriﬁes, however, that even if implementation is possible, those
provision rules become undesirable. Put diﬀerently, there do not exist prior
beliefs that support Qi or Qi′ under Scenario 3. The reason has already been
discussed in the previous subsection. The welfare burden of two excessive
tax rates becomes prohibitive. For instance, one can show that the planner
prefers to communicate with only one class of individuals; that is, to choose
Q1 or Q2 instead. Even though this implies that some information is lost,
it requires only one excessive tax rate. The total eﬀect is a larger level of
expected utilitarian welfare.
5 Robustness
Up to now, it has been assumed that there are only two alternative uses of the
proceeds from linear taxation: covering the cost of public good provision;
and “waste” for incentive reasons. This raises the question how far the
results depend on these assumptions: e.g. what would the the analysis look
like if direct income transfers were allowed and excessive tax revenues could
be returned to the agents? A further concern is the degree to which results
rely on the fact that taxation is linear. Below, I report on a series of exercises
that study the robustness of this paper’s results.
I ﬁrst argue that the linear tax on income is necessary if a higher tax revenue
requirement is to do greater harm to the more productive. To see this,
suppose that taxation is non-linear and that direct income transfers are
allowed as in Bierbrauer (2005b).16 In this setting, an increased revenue
requirement, due to public good provision, yields a larger private utility loss
for less able individuals. The property of increasing diﬀerences, established
in Lemma 1, is hence replaced by decreasing diﬀerences. The underlying
reason is as follows: An optimal non-linear income tax is an arrangement of
redistribution under incentive constraints. As shown in Bierbrauer (2005b),
this implies that the more able class who already ﬁnances the transfer system
cannot be used to generate additional tax revenues for the public good. In
addition, it is proven that, even though incentive requirements imply that a
utilitarian planner has to deviate from the complete information benchmark,
the more ﬂexible instrument of a non-linear income tax makes it possible to
avoid a waste of tax revenues.
Similar results can be obtained in the following environment: the linear
income tax rate τ is not only raised to cover the cost of public good provision,
16The problem of preference revelation is introduced into the framework of a two-class
economy, as, for instance, analyzed in Stiglitz (1982) or Boadway and Keen (1993).
17but also in order to ﬁnance a lump sum transfer α, which is equal for all
individuals in the economy. If both τ and α are set optimally according
to a utilitarian welfare function,17 the need to ﬁnance a public project has
two opposing eﬀects. It leads to an increase of τ and to a reduction of α.
It is easy to ﬁnd examples where the second eﬀect dominates,18 implying,
once again, that one has decreasing diﬀerences. Hence, the mere fact that a
linear tax system is in operation does not imply that the rich are going to
suﬀer relatively more if additional tax revenues are needed. This eﬀect will
occur only if redistribution is not reduced too much in response to public
good provision.
To sum up, the discussion shows that the analysis of this paper is applicable
only if the level of income transfers is kept ﬁxed and public good provision
is ﬁnanced by additional linear taxes.
6 Concluding Remarks
An important theme in political economics is the question whether or not
political competition induces eﬃcient outcomes.19 Polo (1998) and Svens-
son (2000) study this question in the context of a probabilistic voting model.
The authors show that equilibrium rents, deﬁned as an excess of tax rev-
enues over the cost of public good provision, are positive. This observation
seems to support the view that political competition yields undesirable out-
comes.
The present paper, by contrast, does not attempt to model the outcome
of the political process in a somewhat realistic manner. Instead, the paper
describes what an ideal arrangement looks like under the assumptions that
there exist two groups of agents and that a policy decision has to based on
their behavior in a revelation game. It turns out that a constrained eﬃcient
allocation may involve a waste of tax revenues. Burning money may be a
valuable policy option in order to ensure that private information becomes
available for public decision making.
This sheds a diﬀerent light on the results mentioned above. The mere fact
that an equilibrium outcome of some political game involves a budget sur-
plus cannot be taken as evidence of ineﬃciency. Such a conclusion requires
the identiﬁcation of the constrained eﬃcient allocations under all relevant
informational, institutional and technological restrictions. In particular, the
17This model has been studied in more detail by Sheshinski (1972) and Hellwig (1986).
18Suppose that u(x) = ln(x) and v(x) = x
γ. For γ → 1, the optimal linear tax rate
becomes independent of the revenue requirement kQ(θ1,θ2); that is, the public good is
just crowding out the income transfer α.
19Alternative views on that issue are associated with the labels of Virginia, for emphasis
on ineﬃciencies induced by rent-seeking, and Chicago, for the idea that competition among
politicians leaves no room for rent-extraction. See Coate and Morris (1995) and Persson
and Tabellini (2000) for further discussion.
18present paper suggests that excessive tax revenues may not result from the
deﬁciencies political competition but from the fact that the set of policy
instruments is rather limited.
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If this cross derivative is negative, then preferences satisfy the property of
increasing diﬀerences.
Proof of Lemma 2: The monotonicity of admissible provision rules is
derived as follows: consider for example the two incentive compatibility
constraints for class 1, given that θ2 = θL:
if θ1 = θL : θLQ(θL,θL) + V1(θL,θL) ≥ θLQ(θH,θL) + V1(θH,θL) ,
if θ1 = θH : θHQ(θH,θL) + V1(θH,θL) ≥ θHQ(θL,θL) + V1(θL,θL) .
Adding up these inequalities gives Q(θH,θL) ≥ Q(θL,θL). Similarly, one
derives the constraints Q(θL,θH) ≥ Q(θL,θL), Q(θH,θH) ≥ Q(θH,θL) and
Q(θH,θH) ≥ Q(θL,θH).
Proof of Lemma 3:
a) Suppose θH ≥ U∗(0,w2)−U∗(τ1L,w2). Consider the relaxed problem,





∗∗ could be reduced in a feasible and incentive compatible
manner, thereby contradicting optimality. The optimal level of ¯ τ then
has to ensure that IC1 is binding. Hence, ¯ τ∗∗ = τ1L. The assumption
θH ≥ U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2) implies that IC2 can indeed be ignored.
b) Let θH < U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2), and suppose a solution exists. Let
τ2H be the tax rate that is implicitly deﬁned by the equation θH =
19U∗(0,w2)−U∗(τ2H,w2). Again, by deﬁnition of Scenario 1, τ2H > τk.
Note that θH < U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2) implies τ2H < τ1L.
i) It must be the case that ¯ τ∗∗ > τk. Suppose, to the contrary, that




∗∗,w1) − U∗(¯ τ∗∗,w1) ≤ ∆U∗
1 < θL .
ii) It must be the case that τ
¯
∗∗ > 0. Suppose, to the contrary, that
τ
¯
∗∗ = 0. Then IC1 implies ¯ τ∗∗ ≥ τ1L, and IC2 implies ¯ τ∗∗ ≤ τ2H,
contradicting τ2H < τ1L.
iii) At least one (IC) constraint has to be binding. Otherwise – with
τ
¯
∗∗ > 0 and ¯ τ∗∗ > τk – both tax rates could be reduced in a
feasible and incentive compatible manner. To see that both (IC)
constraints have to be binding, suppose, for instance, that, at an
optimum, IC2 binds and IC1 does not. Then, both tax rates could
be reduced in a feasible and incentive compatible manner – keep-
ing the equality in the constraint for class 2, while not violating
the one for class 1 – thereby increasing utilitarian welfare.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, optimal welfare EWq for each provision
rule is derived, where the superscript q refers to the provision rule. In the
second step, those welfare levels are compared to determine the optimal pro-
vision rule.
Rule Q ≡ 0: EWQ≡0 = U∗(0,w1) + U∗(0,w2) .
Rule Qi′: Along the same lines as for Problem P, one derives that the





) + pHHWp(¯ τ)
s.t. τ
¯
≥ 0 , ¯ τ ≥ τk (BC) ,
θH ≥ U∗(τ
¯
,w2) − U∗(¯ τ,w2) (IC2) ,
U∗(τ
¯
,w1) − U∗(¯ τ,w1) ≥ θL (IC1) .
The solution to this problem has been characterized in Lemma 3. If θH ≥
20U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2), then expected welfare is given as:
EWi′ = (1 − pHH)(U∗(0,w1) + U∗(0,w2))
+pHH(2θH + U∗(τ1L,w1) + U∗(τ1L,w2)) .
(7)
If θH < U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2), either rule Qi′ cannot be implemented
or the optimal combination of τ
¯
and ¯ τ, for which both IC constraints are
binding, is chosen. Denote these as τLL and τHH, respectively. Then,
EWi′ = (1 − pHH)(U∗(τLL,w1) + U∗(τLL,w2))
+pHH(2θH + U∗(τHH,w1) + U∗(τHH,w2)) .
(8)
Rule Q1: Under provision rule Q1, (IC2) requires V2(θL,θH) = V2(θL,θL)
and V2(θH,θH) = V2(θH,θL), or equivalently τ
¯
:= τ(θL,θL) = τ(θL,θH) and





) + (pHL + pHH)Wp(¯ τ)
s.t. τ
¯
≥ 0 , ¯ τ ≥ τk (BC) ,
θH ≥ U∗(τ
¯
,w1) − U∗(¯ τ,w1) ≥ θL (IC1) .
It is easily veriﬁed that, at an optimum, only the constraint U∗(τ
¯
,w1) −
U∗(¯ τ,w1) ≥ θL is binding. Optimal taxes are given as τ
¯
∗∗ = 0 and ¯ τ∗∗ = τ1L.
Expected utilitarian welfare under rule Q1 equals:
EW1 = (pLL + pLH)(U∗(0,w1) + U∗(0,w2))
(pHL + pHH)(U∗(τ1L,w1) + U∗(τ1L,w2))
+pHL(θL + θH) + 2pHHθH .
(9)
Rule Q2: Under provision rule Q2, (IC1) requires V1(θH,θL) = V1(θL,θL)
and V1(θH,θH) = V1(θL,θH), or equivalently τ
¯
:= τ(θL,θL) = τ(θH,θL) and





) + (pLH + pHH)Wp(¯ τ)
s.t. τ
¯
≥ 0 , ¯ τ ≥ τk (BC) ,
θH ≥ U∗(τ
¯
,w2) − U∗(¯ τ,w2) ≥ θL (IC2) .
21By deﬁnition of Scenario 2, the optimal tax policy τ = 0 if Q = 0 and τ = τk
if Q = 1 is incentive compatible, and expected utilitarian welfare becomes:
EW2 = (pLL + pHL)(U∗(0,w1) + U∗(0,w2))
+(pLH + pHH)(U∗(τk,w1) + U∗(τk,w2))
+pLH(θL + θH) + 2pHHθH .
(10)
Rule Qi: The solution to this problem has been characterized in Lemma 3,
i.e. if θH ≥ U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L), expected utilitarian equals:
EWi = pLL(U∗(0,w1) + U∗(0,w2))
+(1 − pLL)(U∗(τ1L,w1) + U∗(τ1L,w2))
+(pLH + pHL)(θL + θH) + 2pHHθH .
(11)
If, to the contrary, θH < U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2), then, if a solution to the
planner’s problem exists, expected utilitarian welfare equals:
EWi = pLL(U∗(τLL,w1) + U∗(τLL,w2))
+(1 − pLL)(U∗(τHH,w1) + U∗(τHH,w2))
+(pLH + pHL)(θL + θH) + 2pHHθH .
(12)
Rule Q ≡ 1: Under provision rule Q ≡ 1, expected utilitarian welfare equals:
EWQ≡1 = U∗(τk,w1) + U∗(τk,w2)
+2pLLθL + (pLH + pHL)(θL + θH) + 2pHHθH .
(13)
The proof of Proposition 2 is now established by the following claims:
Claim 1. Under scenario 2, Q ≡ 0 and Qi′ are strictly dominated by Q2.
EW2 > (1 − pHH)(U∗(0,w1) + U∗(0,w2))
+pHH(U∗(τk,w1) + U∗(τk,w2) + 2θH) .
(14)
Under Scenario 2, the right hand side is strictly larger than EWi′
and
EWQ≡0.
22Claim 2. If θH < U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2), then EWi′
= EWi: Using the
equations θH = U∗(τLL,w2)−U∗(τHH,w2) and U∗(τLL,w1)−U∗(τHH,w1) =
θL to substitute for θL and θH in the expressions for EWi′
and EWi in equa-
tions (12) and (8) reveals that EWi′
= EWi.
Claim 3. If θH < U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2), then EWi < EW2: This is
a direct consequence of Claims 1 and 2.
Claim 4. If θH ≥ U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2), then EWi ≥ EW1 with equality
if and only if θH = U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2): To see this, use equations (11)
and (9), as well as the deﬁnition of τ1L, to derive:
EWi − EW1 = pLH(U∗(τ1L,w2) + θH − U∗(0,w2)) . (15)
Claim 5. If θH < U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2), then EW1 < EW2: Equations
(9) and (10) imply:
EW2 − EW1 =
pHL(U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2) − θH)
+pLH(U∗(τk,w1) + U∗(τk,w2) + θL + θH − U∗(0,w1) − U∗(0,w2))
+pHH(U∗(τk,w1) + U∗(τk,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w1) − U∗(τ1L,w2)) .
All terms in this sum are strictly positive under Scenario 2.
Claim 6. EW2 − EWQ≡1 may become positive or negative, depending on
the prior probabilities: From equations (13) and (10):
EW2 − EWQ≡1 =
pLL(U∗(0,w1) + U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τk,w1) − U∗(τk,w2) − 2θL)
+pHL(U∗(0,w1) + U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τk,w1) − U∗(τk,w2) − θL − θH) .
Under Scenario 2, the ﬁrst term is positive and the second is negative.
Claim 7. Let θH ≥ U∗(0,w2)−U∗(τ1L,w2). EW2−EWi and EWQ≡1−EWi
may become positive or negative, depending on the prior probabilities: From
23equations (10), (11) and (13), one derives:
EW2 − EWi =
pHL(U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2) − θH)
+(pLH + pHH)(U∗(τk,w1) + U∗(τk,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w1) − U∗(τ1L,w2)) ,
and
EWQ≡1 − EWi =
pLL(U∗(τk,w1) + U∗(τk,w2) + 2θL − U∗(0,w1) − U∗(0,w2))
+(1 − pLL)(U∗(τk,w1) + U∗(τk,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w1) − U∗(τ1L,w2)) .
For both diﬀerences the ﬁrst term is negative and the second is positive. The
expressions for EW2 − EWQ≡1, EW2 − EWi and EWQ≡1 − EWi derived
above are linear, hence continuous in the probabilities, implying that, for
θH ≥ U∗(0,w2) − U∗(τ1L,w2), any of the rules Q2, Qi or Q ≡ 1 may yield
the maximal level of welfare.
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